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Although the impacts of greenhouse gas build-up remain uncertain, they have the 
potential to be very serious and possibly catastrophic. If the outcomes are serious then 
neither improving energy efficiency nor adaptation policies will cope with the 
problems of warming. Reducing climate impacts without impeding economic 
development will require new low or zero emissions energy carriers and associated 
technologies. This paper argues that current innovation policy initiatives aim at only 
limited dimensions of energy technology: they either promote incremental change in 
existing technologies, or improving performance in existing renewable alternatives. 
They will neither induce fundamental innovation in carrier technologies, nor change 
the basic technological regime of hydrocarbon production, distribution and use. For 
this, more radical „mission-oriented‟ programmes are necessary. In turn, these will 
require new policy instruments and methods, new roles for government, and new 
dimensions of international collaboration and global governance of innovation 




How can we sustain global economic performance while reducing and perhaps eliminating 
climate impacts? This dual objective ultimately requires the innovation of radically new low- 
or zero-emitting energy technologies. But what is involved in such innovation, and why and 
how should governments support it? What are the implications for innovation policymakers? 
 
The paper discusses the nature of the innovation challenge of climate change, develops a 
framework for analysing modes of innovation, applies the framework to energy technologies 
and analyses policies for energy innovation. The overall argument is that we are „locked in‟ to 
an unsustainable but large-scale hydrocarbon energy system. The innovation problem is to 
develop  alternatives  to  this  system  as  a  whole.  Yet  despite  widespread  environmental 
innovation efforts and incentives, these are not yet addressing the innovation challenge on an 
adequate scale.  
 
The  analytical  framework  sees  technologies  not  as  single  techniques  but  as  multi-faceted 
technological “regimes”. Technological regimes comprise production systems and methods, 
scientific  and  engineering  knowledge  organisation,  infrastructures,  and  social  patterns  of 
technology  use.  We  live  not  with  individual  energy  technologies  but  with  a  complex 
hydrocarbon regime.  
 
Against  this  background  we  can  identify  three  modes  of  innovation,  with  very  different 
characteristics. They are 
  
  Incremental  innovations  -  upgrades  to  existing  technologies,  producing  innovation 
within existing technological regimes, such as increases in the capabilities and speeds 
of microprocessors.  
  Disruptive  innovations  -  new  methods  of  performing  existing  technical  functions, 
changing how things are done, but not changing the overall regime, such as the shift 
from film to digital imaging.  
  Radical  innovations  -  technological  regime  shifts,  involving  wholly  new  technical 
functions, new knowledge bases, and new organisational forms, such as the transition 
from steam power systems to electricity.  
 
We need environmental innovations on all three of these dimensions of innovation, but we 
have innovation programs and policy instruments for only the first two. There are no large 
integrated programs seeking regime-shifting innovation of the final type.  
 
Current policies instruments for environmental change have four basic forms - carbon taxes or 
emissions constraints, subsidy and procurement measures, regulatory instruments and R&D 
and commercialisation programs. The first set of measures is likely to promote incremental 
innovation only. The second and third would also support the emergence of new technological 
functions. Each is important, and will frame a context in which further change can happen. But 
none will in themselves lead to fundamental innovation in the hydrocarbon regime.  
 
Regime-shifting  innovation  typically  involves  long-term  and  highly  risky  innovation 
programmes along multiple search paths. In the past, such programmes have usually rested on 
integrated public and private action. They consist of purposive, goal-oriented changes in the 
overall  systems  of  knowledge,  infrastructure  and  use  patterns  that  make  up  technological 
regimes. In one form or another they entail methods for solving such problems as 
 
  the shared identification of opportunities among entrepreneurs and public agencies   2 
  substantial resource mobilisation and commitment to develop new capabilities  
  methods for the management of innovation risk and uncertainty  
  sustained scientific and technological problem solving, and processes of „collective 
invention‟ 
  „patronage‟ of new technologies through long development periods before they reach 
commercial viability  
  new infrastructures and institutions 
  integration of public sector and business investment commitments   
 
Most of the core technologies of the modern world have involved such processes, very often 
initiated or coordinated via public agencies of various kinds. The public-sector roles have been 
necessary for coordination purposes, for resource commitments, and for risk management. 
These  considerations  suggest  very  different  roles  for  government  in  climate-relevant 
innovation than are currently envisaged in the climate debate.  
 
We now require new large-scale “mission-oriented” technology programs for low- or zero 
emissions energy carriers and technologies, resting on public sector coordination and taking a 
system-wide perspective. However the key point about global warming is that it results from a 
global  negative  externality,  which  is  beyond  the  capabilities  of  any  single  government  to 
resolve. Government action for technology development is also constrained by globalisation, 
by changing views of the legitimate roles of government, and by changing forms of the state at 
the  present  time  (in  particular  the  decline  of  nation  states  and  the  rise  of  transnational 
governance).  
 
This is therefore a challenge for which global innovation policy cooperation is necessary. The 
paper  concludes  by  discussing  possible  mechanisms  and  governance  of  such  cooperation, 
advocating the need for a transnational agency - either wholly new or developed out of an 
existing agency – to act as a forum for transnational policy networks and as a mechanism for 
the development of a truly global innovation policy for climate change. 
 
If these challenges are intimidating, it is worth noting that innovation outcomes on a similar 
scale are not unprecedented. Unforeseen energy carriers have emerged before, the most recent 
spectacular example being nuclear power, which was simply unenvisaged considerably less 
than a century ago. The challenge of landing men on the moon involved technologies that did 
not exist when President Kennedy formulated the objective. The technological challenge of 
storing energy on a large scale appears to be intractable, but our society has solved an arguably 
bigger  storage  problem,  that  of  storing,  rapidly  searching  and  retrieving  vast  volumes  of 
information. The technologies for doing this were unforeseeable only a short time ago, and 
were generated by the sorts of programs advocated here. Against the background of the history 
of technology, which is one of extraordinary innovation and diffusion, we have no reason to be 
pessimistic  about  the  challenges  we  face  with  respect  to  energy  and  environmental 
sustainability. The real challenge is the nature of the global leadership that will be required to 
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1.  GLOBAL WARMING AND INNOVATION 
 
What are the main innovation and technology policy problems in stabilising and then 
reducing greenhouse-gas emissions from our currently dominant hydrocarbon energy 
technologies? The argument here is that continued innovation is central to the solution 
of  environmental  problems  related  to  energy,  and  that  such  innovation  should  be 
directed towards creating low- or zero-emission technology options that are capable of 
replacing  the  hydrocarbon  „regime‟.  Later  sections  address  what  is  involved  in 
climate-relevant innovation, both in terms of the nature of innovation processes, and 
the policy support issues. 
 
1.1 The innovation policy challenges of climate change 
 
There are some environmentalists who argue that sustainability must mean attenuating 
our total energy consumption. The position suggested here, however, is that we should 
seek  sustainable  greenhouse  gas  emission  targets,  without  reducing  global  energy 
consumption drastically.  
 
The reason for this is that the people of the world will clearly seek to improve current 
levels of global economic development, and this will require maintaining and even 
increasing  levels  of  energy  consumption.1  Achieving  growth  without  continued 
greenhouse gas build-up implies that low-emissions energy innovation must occur and 
be  multi-faceted.  This  can  happen  via  reduced  emissions  from  currently  used 
technologies, or the development of a wide variety of low-emission technologies that 
may not individually have any prospect of replacing current technologies. We can also 
encourage  life-style  and  consumption  changes.  Taken  together  these  can  have 
significant effects. However, if rapid growth continues on the basis of hydrocarbons, 
the effects may be limited in relation to the overall scale of the climate problem.2 This 
                                                            
1 In the long run, economic development is associated with decreasing energy inputs per unit 
of output, because growth involves shifts to lower-energy activities such as services. But if 
global output grows rapidly, especially in large economies such as Brazil, China and India, 
decreasing energy coefficients will not necessarily stabilise energy use in the foreseeable 
future. For a discussion, see David I. Stern, „Economic growth and energy‟, Encyclopedia of 
Energy, Vol. 2, 2004. 
 
2 Probably the best available overview relating the technical issues in environmental 
technologies to their economic costs and impacts is John M Deutch and Richard K. Lester,   4 
suggests that any long-term strategy must also include search for full technological 
alternatives  to  the  hydrocarbon-based  technologies  -  for  low  or  zero  emission 
innovations in large-scale technologies for energy production, distribution and use. 
These latter innovations are difficult to forecast, and likely to be radical in the sense 
that they will go far beyond our current knowledge bases and technological horizons.  
 
In addressing climate change we therefore face the need for at least two distinct modes 
of innovation: one which inflects existing technologies and their development paths, 
and a second which creates entirely new technologies. In understanding any transitions 
away from our current situation, it is extremely important to recognise the specific 
characteristics  of  these  different  types  of  innovation  processes.  Policies  directed 
toward encouraging one mode of innovation may be utterly ineffective towards the 
other. Over the past two or three decades there has been a substantial global research 
effort on the sources, characteristics, and directions of innovation which throws some 
light on these issues. The empirical and conceptual conclusions from this research are 
often at odds with both popular and policy understandings of innovation, but they are 
highly relevant to our climate predicament.3 
 
In particular, radical technological change usually faces a major problem, which is that 
it  competes  with  the  dominant  technology  currently  in  use.  Existing  dominant 
technologies usually have powerful commercial advantages over new technologies, 
even if the new is potentially superior in the long run. This is certainly the case with 
energy technologies – at present there are no technologies that can compete with the 
hydrocarbon regime. So in considering new technologies it is important to distinguish 
between  innovations  and  policies  that  in  effect  aim  to  keep  the  hydrocarbon 
technology running, while mitigating its effects, and policies that seek to change it. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Making Technology Work. Applications in Energy and the Environment (Cambridge: CUP) 
2004. Their very careful analyses suggest limits to the benefits to be achieved from a number 
of technological alternatives, and hence a need for further search. 
 
3 The most comprehensive single overview of the recent research effort on innovation is J. 
Fagerberg, D. Mowery and R. Nelson (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Innovation (Oxford: 
OUP) 2004. Previous applications of this „innovation studies‟ effort to environmental 
problems include J. Alic, D. Mowery and E. Rubin, U.S Technology and Innovation Policies – 
Lessons for Climate Change, Pew Centre on Global Climate Change, 2003; and J-P. Voss, D. 
Bauknecht and R. Kemp (eds), Reflexive Governance for Sustainable Development, (Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham), 2006.   5 
The argument of this paper is that our currently dominant technologies will be affected 
but not fundamentally changed either by economic factors (including price shifts and 
tax policies) or by regulatory action. This is because the relevant technologies take the 
form of complex interlocking systems that are characterized by long-run cumulative 
development.  Complexity  and  cumulativeness  underlie  „lock-in‟  –  the  inability  to 
move away from technologies that are in some sense less adequate than alternatives.  
 
This is the basic problem with hydrocarbons: we do not have simply a technological 
system but a social and economic one. Hydrocarbon energy carriers and technologies 
are a central component of the urban ecologies of the world, the location and trade 
patterns  of  global  industry,  and  global  transport  patterns  related  to  both  human 
mobility and economic consumption: they are tied intimately to the social construction 
of our modes of life. In this situation, the twin policies of quantity constraints on 
emissions or carbon taxes change the marginal costs of one part of the system (fuel use 
itself) and thus impel economising behaviour including efficiency-seeking innovation. 
But these instruments provide neither incentives nor routes towards a change in the 
system itself, which is a much more complex socio-technical problem.  
 
One practical illustration of the problem here might run along the following lines. The 
EU and the US economies are of broadly comparable size. Over several decades EU 
governments  have  systematically  raised  petrol  prices  through  taxation,  and  pump 
prices  are  significantly  higher  than  the  USA:  in  2003  the  retail  petrol  price  in 
Germany, roughly the median in Europe, averaged 1110 euros per 1000 litres, which 
was  more  than  double  the  US  retail  price  at  that  time.  The  result  appears  to  be 
differences  in  fuel  economy  of  vehicles,  but  no  shift  away  from  private  vehicle 
transport in Europe. On the contrary, the EU stock of private cars in 2005 was 219.8 
million in 2005, 61% higher than the USA at 136.6 million cars. However the USA 
has 108.8 million trucks, compared to the EU‟s 31.8 million, largely deriving from the 
fact that many American SUVs are classified as light trucks. Adding the difference in 
trucks (77 million) to the US stock of cars would mean that total non-goods vehicle 
stocks are almost identical in the EU and the USA. In other words, the end result of 
significantly  different  fuel  prices  appears  to  be  marked  differences  in  vehicle  and 
engine types (with extensive innovation and diffusion of diesel engines in cars in the 
EU, for example) and fuel economy, and differences in vehicle use patterns, but no   6 
shift away from the ownership of private vehicles for transport in Europe. This is 
despite the existence of high-quality public transport systems in many European cities. 
Sustained tax and price differences have affected the trajectories of vehicle innovation, 
but have had minimal impact on the scale of private-vehicle transport choices. 
 
More generally, it is difficult to think of a carbon price that would generate systemic 
change, as opposed to incremental change within the existing technology. The reason 
is that such a price would have to render the hydrocarbon system as a whole unviable, 
and the wider costs of such a price policy would make it impossible to implement. 
Against this background, the most important environmental challenge for innovation 
policy  is  to  think  through  the  reasons  for  the  fundamental  embeddedness  of  the 
hydrocarbon system and its transport technologies, and to consider how it might be 
changed  through  the  creation  of  alternatives.  How  then  can  radical  innovation  be 
initiated and sustained in circumstances  constrained by commercially  efficient  and 
strongly embedded existing technologies?  
 
 
1.2 Externalities and climate change – the results of long-run human innovation 
 
The need for innovation lies in the fact that although the earth‟s climate has rather well 
understood  natural  variation,  related  mainly  to  solar  activity  or  to  the  complex 
dynamics of the earth‟s orbit, current climatic trends appear to derive from the long-
run impacts of technological changes. Human impacts on the environment may have 
deep roots in human history, but they accelerated during and after the first industrial 
revolution as a result of the diffusion of hydrocarbon-based energy carriers and related 
technologies.4 A distinctive feature of economic evolution since the late 18
th century 
has  been  persistent  development  and  use  of  energy-  and  information-intensive 
technologies, and while this has had spectacular effects on technical capabilities and 
                                                            
4 William Ruddiman has argued that significant impacts of human activity on climate can be 
identified following the emergence of farming, approximately 12,000 years ago, but increased 
dramatically 200 years ago. W.F. Ruddiman, Plows, Plagues and Petroleum. How Humans 
Took Control of Climate (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), 2005. 
   7 
on  human  welfare,  the  energy  dimensions  of  modern  technologies  have  also  had 
significant environmental impacts.5  
 
The welfare benefits and environmental costs of past innovation are in fact related, 
because although market economies provide considerable incentives to innovation, 
they are characterized both by imperfect appropriability of innovation benefits, and by 
imperfectly assigned costs of technology use. So market systems encompass both 
positive and negative technological externalities, on a very large scale.6 The positive 
externalities of knowledge creation are powerful drivers of growth. They play a central 
role both in modern theories  of economic growth, and in economic histories of the 
spectacular  growth  performance  of  the  past  two  hundred  years. 7  Environmental 
problems, on the other hand, derive from the negative technological externalities. A 
key issue for policymakers is whether the   negative externalities can be attenuated 
through pricing mechanisms (such as carbon taxes) and regulation (such as mandatory 
emissions caps) or whether they also require control by innovation efforts that extend 
beyond price incentives. 
 
Some of the detrimental externalities of existing technologies are dealt with over time 
by  economic  and  regulatory  processes.  If  resources  become  exhausted  along  a 
predictable  path  where  established  markets  exist,  rising  input  costs  generate 
substitution effects that can impel innovations. This may have powerful effects on 
types and levels of inputs, and on accompanying pollution or emission problems. 8 In 
addition, there are many changes that can be made via regulatory instruments, to 
                                                            
5 On the changing roles of energy carriers and their relations to industrial „development 
blocks‟, see A. Kander, P. Malanima and P. Warde, „Energy transitions in Europe, 1600-
2000‟, paper presented to conference on Technological Transitions and Discontinuities, ECIS, 
Eindhoven, 2008. 
 
6 A technological externality exists when the actions of one economic actor have an effect on 
the welfare or the productivity of another actor indirectly (meaning other than through the 
price system). A familiar example of a negative technological externality is pollution. The 
results of fundamental science are often held to be a positive technological externality. 
 
7 For an overview of the theory on knowledge externalities, see B. Verspagen, „Innovation and 
Economic Growth‟ in Fagerberg et al., op. cit, 487-513; for a historical account, J. Mokyr, The 
Gifts of Athena. Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press), 2002.   8 
mitigate or remove environmental damage. At the present time the main actual or 
proposed  instruments  to  cope  with  climate  change  in  fact  fall  into  this  category: 
regulations to cap emissions outputs (with tradable permits) or taxes to raise their 
costs. Some of these changes, combined with general impulses to cost reduction, have 
led  over  past  decades  to  marked  increases  in  the  energy  efficiency  of  specific 
technologies, notably automobile engines.  In emissions terms however the widening 
of economic activity as growth proceeds can offset these.  
 
1.3 Why does climate change justify major innovation efforts? 
 
While there is no attempt here to assess the evidence on climate change, or current 
debates on its scope, causation or potential paths, it is clearly necessary to suggest why 
radical (and very likely expensive) innovation policies are even being discussed. What 
are the potential paths, effects and costs of climate change? On the one hand, there is 
the scientific consensus embodied in the work of the International Panel on Climate 
Change  (IPCC),  to  the  effect  that  greenhouse  gas  build-up  is  anthropogenic  and 
leading to global warming. On the other, there are vocal objections to the IPCC and 
insistent arguments against the need for any form of action, let alone the rather wide-
scope policy initiatives that will be outlined below. 
 
There are three scientific issues in dispute, and one economic question. Is the global 
climate becoming warmer, is it due to increased greenhouse gases, and is warming due 
to human activity? Beyond this is the economic question: is it worth doing anything 
about it? Objections to action take two forms. On the one hand there are more or less 
explicit lobby groups typically answering no to all three scientific questions, usually 
on  the  basis  of  objections  to  data  and  climate  modeling  results;  on  that  basis  the 
economic question becomes otiose. Advocates for these positions usually argue the 
need for „sound science‟, and claim that there is a scientific uncertainty and hence a 
debate that involves competing conclusions and a lack of scientific consensus. On the 
other hand there are those of a more economic bent who accept that the world is 
becoming warmer and that human activity is responsible, but argue that the costs of 
seeking  to  mitigate  climate  change  far  outweigh  any  potential  benefits.  From  this 
                                                                                                                                                                       
8 F.R. Lichtenberg, „Energy prices and induced innovation‟, Research Policy, 15, 1985, pp.77-
87.   9 
perspective, we should adapt to climate change rather than seeking to modify it. The 
most articulate advocate of this position is Bjorn Lomborg, who argues on the basis of 
a  cost-benefit  analysis  that  spending  money  on  climate  change  is  likely  to  be 
considerably less fruitful than seeking to reduce or eliminate malaria, for instance.9 
 
These positions have two fundamental weaknesses. On the scientific front, we have in 
fact had major programs of work that by any reasonable standard   have generated 
sound science and a scientific consensus. The „lobbying‟ positions tend to neglect the 
fact that discussion of global warming has now been continuing in a serious way for a 
couple of decades. Sixteen years ago, William Cline, in a discussion of the scientific 
and economic issues stressed that  
 
  ... an ambitious plan of firming up the science and greatly elaborating the meagre 
estimates of economic effects is called for over a period of perhaps no more than 
a decade.10 
 
This is more or less exactly what subsequently happened. There has been a sustained 
global research program of scientific work on a very wide range of climate-related issues, 
none of which has disconfirmed the core hypotheses of global warming. While nothing in 
science  is  ever  definitively  settled,  there  is in  fact  a  scientific  consensus,  which is 
summed up in the reports of the IPCC.  This is not purely a scientific consensus, since 
publication also required unanimous political approval by UN member countries. An 
underlying assumption of this paper is that the IPCC work should be accepted as the 
basis of current policy debate on climate change: that is, that current climate scepticism is 
not a responsible basis for policy analysis.  
 
This then leaves the question of the appropriate way in which IPCC work might be 
assessed in economic analysis. One possibility would be simply to take the mean values 
offered by the IPCC, and conduct some kind of cost-benefit analysis of programs for 
                                                            
9 B. Lomborg, Cool It: The Skeptical Environmentalist’s Guide to Global Warming 
(NewYork: Knopf) 2007; B. Lomborg (ed.) Global Crises, Global Solutions (Cambridge: 
CUP) 2004. 
 
10 W.R. Cline, "The Scientific Basis for the Greenhouse Effect", Economic Journal, Vol 101, No 407, 
1991, p. 918.   10 
reducing these means. This is the approach of Lomborg, who concludes that potential 
benefits are small in relation to costs. This approach is open to a range of methodological 
and conceptual challenges.11 One set of these relate to the idea that cost-benefit analyses 
essentially make point estimates of two states, and neglect the dynamic risks associated 
with transitions. Two types of risk are relevant. The first is that global temperatures may 
turn out higher than estimated: the IPCC work contains not only estimates of means for 
global  temperature  increases,  sea  level  rises,  etc,  but  also  confidence  intervals  for 
variation  around  the  means.  That  is,  there  are  estimates  of  probabilities  for  quite 
substantially higher or lower temperature means; at the higher end, global impacts would 
be very severe. The second issue concerns the transition path to a higher-temperature 
world. Here there are not just risks, but uncertainties (in the sense that we cannot estimate 
probabilities, because we do not know what outcomes are even on the agenda). Since 
both  the  earth‟s  climate,  and  ecological  systems  generally,  are  complex  non-linear 
systems, any transition to higher mean temperatures may involve abrupt, unpredictable 
and irreversible shifts into new regions.12 This implies significant risks and uncertainties 
that would be difficult to integrate into a cost-benefit analysis. In this case, we are in need 
of options for coping with events that may be highly uncertain, yet whose impacts would 
be very adverse. This means a need for technological options that would provide some 
measure of hedging against a range of potential outcomes. The question then is how to 
achieve these options: what kinds of new technologies would be necessary to obviate the 
risks posed by our current climate trajectory? 
 
 
1.4 Current  economic  analyses  of  climate  change  and  their  innovation 
approaches 
 
While the economics of climate change is being intensively studied at the present time, 
existing  treatments  of  the  innovation  challenges  are  not  strong.  By  far  the  most 
important  recent  economic  and  policy  analysis  is  the  Stern  Review,  which  has 
                                                            
11 P. Dasgupta, “Standard cost-benefit analysis may not apply to the economics of climate 
change”, a review of B. Lomborg, Cool It, in Nature, 449, September 2007. 
 
12 P. Dasgupta, S. Levin and J. Lubchenko, “Economic pathways to ecological sustainability: 
challenges for the new millennium”, BioScience, 2000, 50 (4), pp. 339-345.   11 
provided  a  major  step  forward,  and  is  probably  the  definitive  treatment  of  the 
economics of climate change at the present time.13 Stern argued that:  
 
  Climate change results from an externality associated with emissions 
  Impacts are global, long term and persistent 
  Uncertainties and risks in impacts are pervasive 
  There is serious risk of major irreversible change with non-marginal economic 
effects 
 
These conclusions suggest both a need for action to avert further climate change, and a 
role for public policy in doing so. However the Review contains a serious problem - 
the innovation dimensions of the climate change challenge are conceptualised in a 
simplistic  way.  Stern  argues  for  a  policy  response  aimed  at  abatement  strategies, 
which would in effect provide incentives to innovation. The abatement strategy seeks 
to generate such incentives by changing the costs associated with carbon use, or by 
directly  focusing  on  innovation  via  technological  advances  in  power,  heat  and 
transport technologies. The main measures proposed by Stern are: 
 
  Reduce demand for emissions-intensive goods and services (via carbon taxes) 
  Seek fuel efficiency gains (replace coal power with extra 2 million windmills 
plus 7GW more nuclear) 
  Develop  low-carbon  power,  heat  and  transport  technologies  (cut  carbon 
emissions by 25% in buildings, raise car fuel efficiency from 30 to 60 mpg) 
  Reduce non-fossil fuel emissions by reducing deforestation 
 
Significant innovation is required by all but the last of these measures. The new 
technologies – particularly in power, heat and transport - aimed at by Stern will 
certainly require policy incentives and support measures. This point is emphasized in 
the recent Pew Climate Change Centre report, which remarks that  
 
Stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of CO2 and other GHGs at a “safe” 
level, the international goal under the United Nations Framework Convention 
                                                            
13 N. Stern, The Economics of Climate Change. The Stern Review (Cambridge: CUP), 2006.   12 
on Climate Change, would have profound implications for industrial and 
industrializing economies alike. Human activity now adds around 8 billion 
metric tons of GHGs to the earth‟s atmosphere each year, a total that is 
growing approximately 4 percent annually. A widely discussed goal of 
stabilizing atmospheric CO2 at twice the pre-industrial level by 2100 (i.e., at 
550 parts per million, 65 percent higher than today‟s concentration) implies 
worldwide CO2 reductions on the order of 60 to 80 percent below projected 
“business as usual” levels for the remainder of the 21st century. Substantial 
reductions in U.S. CO2 emissions would require that the United States replace 
or retrofit hundreds of electric power plants and substantially improve the 
efficiency of tens of millions of vehicles. In addition, appliances, furnaces, 
building systems, and factory equipment numbering in the hundreds of 
millions might also need to be modified or replaced. Technological change on 
this scale cannot happen immediately. Many of the technologies needed do not 
yet exist commercially or require further development to reduce costs or 
improve reliability.14 
 
The Stern Review approaches the innovation issue by recommending policies based on 
R&D and commercialisation strategies, seeing the problem essentially in terms of a 
low level of R&D in energy and transport sectors. This is, in effect, to deploy the so-
called „linear model of innovation‟, in which innovation proceeds in a more or less 
linear fashion from research through to engineering and applied development, and then 
to diffusion.   
 
The problem – to be discussed in more detail below - is that this is an outdated and 
indeed discredited view of innovation. Innovation only rarely begins with R&D, and in 
only a very small proportion of cases might be seen as the commercialisation of some 
prior  act  of  discovery  founded  in  R&D  results.  The  „R&D  +  commercialisation‟ 
approach used by Stern is certainly popular among science lobbies and governments, 
but  simply does  not  reflect  the dominant  processes by  which most innovation has 
occurred historically.  
 
                                                            
14 Alic et al, op.cit, p.4   13 
The central difficulty here is that the conceptual underpinnings of the approach to 
innovation in the Stern Review simply do not accord with what we know about the 
generation  of  large-scale  radical  innovations  in  the  advanced  economies.  The  key 
challenge to be addressed, therefore, is how we can apply the concepts and methods of 
recent innovation research to the innovation problems of climate change.  
 
2.  LARGE-SCALE  INNOVATION:  A  CONCEPTUAL  AND  HISTORICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
This  section  turns  to  the  question  of  how  innovation  can  be  conceptualised  and 
understood,  and  what  the  implications  might  be  for  future  energy  technologies. 
Continuous innovation is one of the few phenomena really distinguishing modernity 
from previous epochs, yet it has only rather recently begun to be studied empirically 
and theoretically in any detail.  A survey of this work would go far beyond the scope 
of  this  paper,  but  this  section  outlines  a  framework  for  thinking  about  modes  of 
innovation, drawing on some core concepts from recent innovation research. One aim 
here is to distinguish between forms of innovation for which strong incentives and 
opportunities exist in market economies and those that face more or less severe lock-in 
constraints. Innovation has many modalities, and a central point here is the need to 
recognise the complex diversity  of sources  and constraints  that generate or inhibit 
different types of innovation. Policy-makers are not always aware that incentives for 
innovation may be highly localised in terms of what modes of innovation they are 
likely to produce, and this is a serious problem in seeking new technologies in the face 
of climate change.  
 
The discussion in this section turns on five basic issues explored in the analysis of 
innovation, namely: 
 
1.  The role of formal Research and Development (R&D) in innovation processes, 
distinguishing between R&D as a source of innovation and R&D as problem-
solving activity within ongoing innovation processes 
2.  Differences in modes of innovation, particularly with respect to the novelty of 
innovations in relation to existing technological knowledge, and the roles of 
different social actors in generating them   14 
3.  Technological  complexity,  and  in  particular  the  need  to  understand 
technologies not as individual artifacts but as more or less complex technical 
systems; the central concepts here is those of the „technological regime‟ or 
„technological paradigm‟.  
4.  The roles of „innovation systems‟, meaning the roles of persistent industrial, 
institutional  and  social  frameworks,  in  shaping  or  constraining  paths  of 
technological change 
5.  Resting on the above characteristics, are concepts of „path dependence‟ and 
„lock-in‟, each of which refers to the ways in which technological regimes and 
innovation  systems  inhibit  the  innovation  of  technological  alternatives,  or 
prevent transition away from existing technologies. 
 
Against the background of these concepts and ideas, the paper will then turn to a 
discussion of different modes of environmental innovation, and how they might be 
supported and achieved. 
 
2.1 The role of R&D in innovation: a source, or an accompaniment? 
 
 
An influential popular view of innovation – much promoted by leading scientists, for 
obvious reasons – is that innovation derives from research, and especially scientific 
research.  
 
This model of innovation, in which discovery processes precede the translation of 
research results into engineering process and then into products, very rarely describes 
either business-sector innovation or the wider ways in which major technologies have 
entered  the  world.  A  core  result  of  modern  innovation  research  is  that  R&D  is 
generally not an originating process of innovation.15 At the firm level, firms compete 
technologically not by performing R&D looking for applications, but by building new 
product concepts that draw heavily on existing knowledge bases. As they seek to build 
new products they constantly face unanticipated problems, some of which require 
                                                            
15 A classic statement of the issue here, more than twenty years ago, was Stephen Kline and 
Nathan Rosenberg, “An overview of innovation”, in R. Landau and N. Rosenberg (eds) The 
Positive Sum Strategy. Harnessing Technology for Economic Growth (Washington: National 
academy Press) 1986, pp.275-306; also S. J. Kline, “Innovation is not a linear process”, 
Research Management, July-August, pp. 36-45, 1985. 
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R&D to solve. This means that R&D is best seen as a problem-solving activity within 
existing innovation programs, rather than a search mechanism for new discoveries. 
That is, innovation is usually non-linear in character: work starts, there are problems 
and  feedbacks,  there  may  be  R&D  along  the  way,  with  testing,  development  and 
market exploration going on constantly. The real problem is how new product and 
process  development programs  get  started, and how they are continued, especially 
when setbacks occur.  
 
Looking beyond R&D at the firm level, there is a question about the role of R&D in 
developing “big” technologies. The technological landscape of the modern world rests 
on major innovations that have been developed largely by agencies other than firms. 
Virtually all of the “core” technologies of modernity – in electronics and computing, 
materials, communications, transport, and industrial production methods, for example 
– were initiated and brought to feasibility with the heavy involvement of universities 
and  public  or  quasi-public  labs,  and  via  large-scale  publicly-funded  technology 
programs.  As  with  firm-level  innovation,  these  programs  were  not  R&D-driven, 
although much R&D was done. Rather, these can best be understood as the result of 
“mission-oriented”  programs,  aimed  at  producing  specific  technological  solutions, 
often  heavily  influenced  by  military  objectives.  The  implications  of  this  will  be 
discussed below. In any event, neither knowledge of how companies actually innovate, 
nor knowledge of how modern technologies actually emerged, supports the idea that 
we can generate significant new technologies purely via R&D programs (whether or 
not they are accompanied by commercialisation programs). 
 
2.2 Technological  regimes  and  modes  of  innovation:  incremental,  disruptive, 
radical 
 
The technologies of the modern world are immensely complex, being the outcomes of 
long evolutionary processes of technical and organisational development. The result is 
that the technological landscape is a multi-faceted, multilayered array of technologies 
across a very wide space of technical functions. Analysing this complexity presents 
enormous conceptual and classificatory challenges. To keep things manageable in the 
face of this, what is suggested here is a simple three-level taxonomy of innovations 
organised around the concept of a „technological regime‟.    16 
 
It was noted above that technologies are not singular, isolated artefacts. Rather, they 
exist within complex scientific, engineering and economic frameworks that determine 
the  broad  „shape‟  of  a  specific  technology  at  any  point  in  time.  This  means  that 
particular technological functions are open to only a limited range of changes at any 
moment, and are thus ordered or structured. Innovation theory has a wide range of 
concepts for denoting this phenomenon – the concept of „technological paradigms‟, for 
example, is widely used, as is the concept of „design configuration‟ or the notion of 
„technological system‟.16 These concepts are closely related. Here, a „technological 
regime‟ refers to the whole complex of scientific knowledge, engineering practices, 
process technologies, infrastructure, and product characteristics, skills and procedures 
that make up the totality of a technology. However a technological regime can extend 
considerably  further  than  the  factors  noted  in  this  definition  –  for  example,  into 
education  and  training  procedures,  arenas  of  tacit  knowledge,  public  procurement 
processes, and regulatory frameworks.  
 
These  elements  of  knowledge,  engineering  practice,  education  and  so  on  serve  to 
„embed‟ the technological regime, and to constrain the possible forms of innovation. 
Innovation  around  technologies  that  are  components  of  a  well-defined  regime  is 
feasible only insofar as it is consonant with the structure of the regime – that is, it must 
be  in  accord  with  the  established  practices,  infrastructures,  and  routines  of  the 
technological  regime.  These  constraints  define  a  particular  route  of  technological 
advance, and this can be understood as the „technological trajectory‟ associated with 
any particular regime. The technological trajectory is thus the set of feasible lines of 
innovation with respect to a regime. Just as the regime has inertia as a result of its 
systemic  complexity,  so  does  the  trajectory  –  that  is  to  say,  innovative  change  is 
possible (and may even be very frequent), but it is ordered, structured and limited by 
the nature of the underlying regime. 
 
                                                            
16 The concept of technological paradigm was introduced in G. Dosi, „Technological paradigms and 
technological trajectories. A suggested interpretation of the determinants and directions of technological 
change‟, Research Policy, 11, 1982, 147-162. 
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Against this background we can identify three broad types of innovation: incremental 
innovation, disruptive innovation and radical innovation. These modes of innovation 
differ in terms of their complexity, time horizons (and hence resource commitments), 
sites of development, risk profiles, degree of novelty in knowledge use and learning 
processes,  constraints,  accompanying  social  change,  and  rationales  for  government 
intervention.  They  also  face  different  obstacles,  and  it  is  this  that  is  particularly 
important for policymakers. 
 
2.3.1 Incremental innovation 
 
Incremental innovation  is  „localised‟  change within a technological regime and its 
associated  trajectory  of  innovation.  It  consists  of  enhancements  of  existing 
technologies,  either  with  respect  to  performance  attributes  or  input  characteristics 
(such as more economical use of materials), but it does not fundamentally change the 
core  characteristics  of  the  existing  technology.  Such  innovation  consists  of 
improvements to pre-existing products, and it also tends to be new at the level of the 
enterprise but not new in any more general sense (either new to the sector or to the 
world as a whole). The world‟s biggest statistical coverage of innovation is the EU‟s 
Community  Innovation  Survey,  the  dataset  of  which  covers  innovation  in 
approximately 400,000 EU firms. This shows clearly that incremental change is the 
dominant form of innovation in the business sector, a result that has been confirmed 
by similar surveys worldwide. This type of innovation may be small but should not be 
underestimated in its cumulative economic impacts, which can be very profound: it 
has been shown many times that the big productivity impacts of innovations usually 
follow not from first introduction, but from cumulative incremental improvements. 
The Community Innovation Survey has also shown that such innovation may have a 
wide range of objectives, including environmental improvements (often as a response 
to regulation). 
 
2.3.2 Disruptive innovation 
 
Secondly, there is change that disrupts and replaces the functional performance of a 
technological regime: it changes how things are done, but usually does not change the 
nature of the technological regime itself. Such change is not uncommon, and involves   18 
a  replacement  of  existing  norms  of  product  design,  performance  attributes  and 
production  processes.  Innovation  in  this  sense  is  a  reshaping  of  how  a  particular 
technical function is fulfilled, and it normally involves not only new products but also 
new systems of suppliers, of education and training. Examples are the substitution of 
computer-based  text  production  for  electric  typewriters,  or  the  shift  from  film  to 
digital  graphics.  These  changes  generally  involve  the  entry  of  new  firms  into  an 
industry, and new groups of firms dominating an industry. Perhaps the most extensive 
studies of such change are those by Abernathy and Utterback, who emphasize a broad 
order to the process of change.17 There tends to be firstly an awareness of a new 
technological possibility, followed by the entry of many technical solutions, followed 
by the emergence of a „dominant design‟ that eliminates most of the variety in the new 
solutions, followed by a long-term shift from product to process innovation in the new 
technology. Examples of such functional changes, and their historical sequences, are 
overviewed in Table 1 below. 
 
This  type  of  innovation  is  sometimes  completely  new  with  respect  to  a  technical 
function, and new with respect to an existing industry. It is often new to the world as a 
whole, although in some cases it can consist of the application of existing technologies 
to new functions. Utterback makes a key point about this type of innovation that is 
highly relevant when thinking about radical innovation with environmental objectives. 
This is that incumbent firms within an industry only rarely undertake such innovation, 
and even more rarely succeed with it (for example Kodak developed digital imaging, 
but was unable to shift quickly enough out of film). This is because enterprises tend to 
be locked in to their existing areas of competence, and to their existing networks of 
suppliers, knowledge collaborators, customers and training apparatuses. One of the 
implications  of  this  is  that  innovations  at  this  level  are  usually  accompanied  by 
changes in industrial structure and company demographics – incumbent firms exit, and 
new entrants based on new knowledge bases and new capabilities come to dominate 
the industry. 
 
                                                            
17 For an overview, see James Utterback, Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation, (Harvard: 
Boston), 1994. A formal treatment is Steven Klepper, „Entry, Exit, Growth and Innovation 
Over the Product Life Cycle‟, American Economic Review, Vol 86, No 3, pp 562-583.   19 
Table 1: Sequences of disruptive innovation  






PCs with WP software 





Lighting  Candles and oil lamps 
Distilled gas 
Incandescent electric lamps 
Fluorescent lamps 
Halogen 




Celluloid role film 
Electronic imaging 
 
Source: James Utterback, Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation, (Harvard: Boston), 
1994. 
 
2.3.3 Radical innovation 
 
Finally,  we  have  truly  radical  form  of  innovation,  meaning  a  full-scale  shift  in 
technological  regime,  as  a  result  of  which  large-scale  changes  occur  in  the 
fundamental enabling technologies of the economy. Here we are not thinking of a shift 
with respect to a single technical function, but rather a more encompassing change that 
alters  the  generic  technologies  that  underpin  many  forms  of  technological  and 
economic activity. 18  Examples of such change might be the broad movement towards 
mechanisation that happened as part of the first industrial revolution, the changes in 
agriculture  associated  with  the  use  of  the  Haber-Bosch  process  and  nitrogenous 
fertilisers, the shift  first to  steam  power systems  and then to  electrification of the 
western  economies  during  the  late  19
th  and  early  20
th  centuries,  the  emergence  of 
internal-combustion vehicle technologies, or the shift towards digitalisation in the late 
                                                            
18 R.G. Lipsey, et al, Economic Transformation: General Purpose Technologies and Long 
Term Economic Growth, (Oxford: OUP) 2005   20 
20
th century.19 Regime shifts of these types change the overall nature of production 
and  industrial  location,  broad  patterns  of  techn ology  use,  social  patterns  of 
consumption, and the nature of relevant infrastructures. These major regime shifts 
seem to have a number of important common features. These include: 
 
  Very long time horizons – the history of steam power, for example, suggests a 
period  from  the  work  of  Torricelli,  Pascal,  Boyle,  and  Hooke  to  the  first 
demonstrations of Papin, to the development of the Watt engine, that must be 
measured in centuries.20 The introduction of the Watt engine to its widespread 
adoption as part of a new factory system took nearly a century.21 
  Processes  of  “collective  invention”  through  which  inventors,  engineers, 
entrepreneurs  and  government agencies dispersed widely in  time and space 
work on technical problems and design configurations.22 
  Patronage  of  emerging  technologies  and  their  knowledge  bases  either  by 
individuals,  societies  or  governments,  which  protects  the  new  technology 
during the (often long) development phase. 
  Niche markets through which emerging technologies are protected from the 
full brunt of competition while they are developed.23 
                                                            
19 Vaclav Smil, Creating the Twentieth Century. Technical Innovations of 1867-1914 and 
Their Lasting Impact (Oxford: OUP), 2005, and Vaclav Smil, Transforming the Twentieth 
Century: Technical Innovations and Their Consequences (Oxford:OUP) 2006 
 
20 A. Nuvolari, The Making of Steam Power Technology. A study of technical change during 
the British Industrial Revolution (Eindhoven: ECIS) 2004 
 
21 N. von Tunzelmann, Steam Power and British Industrialization to 1860 (Oxford: OUP) 
1978. Von Tunzelmann showed that the Watt steam engine diffused very slowly and made 
minimal impact on Britain‟s industrial growth during the “first industrial revolution” (despite 
the fact that many histories of industrialisation are written with steam as the centrepiece). It 
was patented and introduced in 1775, but became competitive only around 1860, after about 
85 years of cumulative improvements, and after related innovation in coal mining reduced fuel 
costs.  
 
22 See for example, P.B Mayer “Episodes of collective invention”, US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2003; and P.B. Mayer, “The airplane as a collective invention” US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2006. For historical examples, J. Mokyr, The Lever of Riches. Technological 
Creativity and Economic Progress, (Oxford: OUP) 1992. 
 
23 René Kemp, Johan Schot and Remco Hoogma, „Regime Shifts to Sustainability through 
Processes of Niche Formation. The Approach of Strategic Niche Management‟, Technology 
Analysis & Strategic Management. Vol. 10, No. 2, 1998, 175-195.    21 
  In the modern era, significant roles for government: government support may 
involve either direct support of the technology, or support for its accompanying 
infrastructures, or both.24 
  Substantial risk, in the sense that is has been extremely common for multiple 
search  processes  to  be  explored,  many  technological  alternatives  to  be 
developed in the early phase of development, with concomitant high failure 
rates and frequent capital losses. 
  Major  changes  in  governance,  social  organisation,  production  methods  and 
management, which themselves may involve long time periods. 
 
There are those who argue that this regime-shift process is the essential form in which 
innovation relates to economic growth, although that appears to take too narrow a 
view of innovation.25 It certainly appears that technological regime shifts on this level 
occur only rarely, and that between them major processes of lock -in occur. A key 
problem (both historically and analytically) concerns how lock-in is overcome.  
 
The climate-change relevance of this is that the dominant generic technological regime 
of our time is the hydrocarbon-based energy system. In other words, the innovation 
problem with respect to climate change is not simply one is one of incremental change 
around present techniques, or even disruptive change, but full-scale „regime change‟. 
Such  change  involves  not  just  a  change  in  dominant  firms  and  their  associated 
knowledge  bases,  but  rather  a  full-scale  shift  in  scientific  and  technological 
knowledge,  and  associated  infrastructures,  and  even  changes  in  economic  and 
technological  organisation  at  the  level  of  national  economies.  Some  of  the  issues 
associated with such change will be discussed in a later section. 
 
2.4 Innovation systems 
 
There is a further framing concept for innovation that is relevant to understanding 
what types of energy innovation are feasible and likely. This is the concept of the 
                                                            
24 This is discussed in more detail below. 
 
25 For a powerful statement of this position, see C. Freeman and F. Louca, As Time Goes By. 
From the Industrial Revolutions to the Information Revolutions (Oxford: OUP), 2001   22 
„innovation system‟, which refers to an even broader dimension of structuring and 
order  in  economic  and  technological  activity.  The  basic  idea  is  that  economic 
behaviour  occurs  within  rule-ordered  frameworks  and  in  the  context  of  persistent 
structural  features.  Even  the  free-est  of  free  market  economies  operates  within 
structures of institutions that legitimate or exclude certain types of behaviour – such 
institutions include the corporate governance system, the system of property rights, the 
legal  framework  of  contract  and  company  law,  labour  market  law  and  regulation, 
systems of intellectual property, and arrangements for finance and risk management of 
economic  activity.  This  institutional  framework  tends  to  be  embodied  in  and 
supplemented by a wide range of regulations that affect such matters as accounting 
procedures, health and safety rules, and environmental impacts. These institutions and 
rules are constraints, but they also have positive effects:  they play the role of reducing 
uncertainty that would otherwise be endemic in economic behaviour. They play a role 
in  shaping  what  kinds  of  innovation  are  and  are  not  possible  in  particular 
environments. 
 
In  addition  to  these  frameworks  of  rules,  we  can  note  at  least  two  other  areas  of 
persistence and differentiation in economies, which have innovation impacts. One is 
the overall system of infrastructure. This consists of physical infrastructures – such as 
roads,  energy  supply,  ports,  water  etc  –  and  of  knowledge  infrastructures  such  as 
universities,  research  institutes,  patent  offices,  and  libraries.  Each  type  of 
infrastructure  tends  to  be  highly  capital  intensive,  with  very  long  life  times  and 
therefore  very  long  investment  horizons.  Such  infrastructures  can  and  do  form  a 
constraint or shaping factor in the types of innovation that may be possible within a 
system.    A  second  important  area  of  differentiation  is  simply  the  economic  and 
industrial structure (and related technological specializations). Regional and national 
economies tend to have different industrial structures and technological specializations 
(and different trade specializations as an effect of the industrial structure) and these 
tend to persist over time, and to shape innovation activities.  
 
The point of thinking in these „systemic‟ terms is that successful innovation is only 
rarely  a  result  of  action  by  an  individual  firm.  In  practice,  success  in  innovation 
involves  complex  interactions  between  a  firm  and  its  environment,  and  a  major 
problem for government is how to understand and shape this „environment‟ in order to   23 
improve  the  innovation  performance  of  businesses.  The  innovation  system  affects 
firms within it by shaping the nature of education and training, the extent and manner 
in which new opportunities can be identified, the ways in which finance is mobilised 
and risk is managed, and the provision and governance of supporting infrastructures. 
Essentially  the  innovation  systems  concept  has  been  a  way  to  discuss  policy 
frameworks and policy actions that can support the overall innovation environment – it 
is probably the most important development in innovation studies in recent years, and 
appears to be playing an increasingly important role in policy development globally.26  
 
2.5 Path dependence and lock-in 
 
A final element of recent innovation studies, central to the issue of climate change, 
concerns the phenomenon of „lock-in‟. „Lock-in refers to the fact that inferior (in some 
relevant sense) technologies may be repeatedly selected in place of superior (in some 
sense) technologies. Incumbent but inferior technologies may face inherent advantages 
because  they  have  benefited  from  (sometimes  long)  trajectories  or  paths  of 
development. In this case, the competitiveness of a technology is “path dependent”. 27 
If there are increasing returns to the adoption of a technology (so that costs fall as 
users increase), or network externalities (so that benefits rise with numbers of users), 
then  over  time  an  incumbent  technology  will  accrue  cost-benefit  advantages  that 
cannot readily be overcome even by a potentially superior technology (in terms of 
performance characteristics and ultimate economics). Understanding the sources of 
lock-in,  and  understanding  how  it  may  be  overcome,  appears  to  be  central  in 
understanding transition paths to cleaner energy technologies. 
 
                                                            
26 For an overview of the analytical use of the concept, Bo Carlsson, “Innovation Systems: A 
Survey of the Literature from a Schumpeterian Perspective”, Paper for the International J.A. 
Schumpeter Society conference, Milan, Italy, June 9-12, 2004; on policy uses L. Mytelka and 
K. Smith, (2002) „Innovation theory and policy learning: an interactive and co-evolving 
process‟, Research Policy, Vol 31, No 8/9. 
 
27 In this sense, lock-in is related to the concept of hysteresis in the natural sciences and 
economics: the idea that we cannot understand the present level of some variable or 
component of a system without understanding its path over time.    24 
From the climate change perspective there are two primary ways of looking at the 
sources of lock-in, and hence at its resolution. One is through the lens of history, and 
the other is through system effects.28  
 
Lock-in may occur simply because an existing technology has a temporal advantage.29 
Innovation is not an individual act that occurs at some point in time, and innovations 
are simply never introduced in their final forms. Rather, innovation is the first point of 
an often very long process during which a flow of performance improvements are 
painstakingly  explored  and  implemented,  resulting  in  q ualitative  improvements  in 
product  performance  characteristics,  and  more  importantly  in  sustained  cost 
reductions. Nathan Rosenberg argues that: 
 
Most innovations are relatively crude and inefficient at the date when they are 
first recognized as constituting a new innovation. They are, of necessity, badly 
adapted to many of the ultimate uses to which they will eventually be put; 
therefore, they may offer only very small advantages, or perhaps none at all, 
over previously existing techniques.30 
 
As a result, even when a subsequent innovation project succeeds in generating a new 
technology,  it  is  likely  to  face  a  major  difficulty.  New  products  are  often 
uncompetitive with existing products because they tend to require significant periods 
of  post-innovation  improvement  and  development  before  they  can  really  compete. 
Products  already  in  the  market  have  benefited  from  often-long  sequences  of 
improvement,  which  may  be  incremental  in  character.  That  is,  there  are  dynamic 
economies of scale, if we think of scale in terms of historically accrued volumes of 
output,  rather  than  the  volume  of  output  at  a particular  point  in  time.  This  is  the 
                                                            
28 W. Brian Arthur, „Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by historical 
events, Economic Journal, 99 (1989) 116-131; Kenneth Arrow, „Increasing returns: 
historiographical issues and path dependence, European Journal of the History of Economic 
Thought, 2000, 171-180. 
 
29 Paul David (1985) „Clio and the economics of QWERTY‟, American Economic Review, 
Vol 75, No 2, pp.332-7. 
 
30 Rosenberg, N.,  Perspectives on Technology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
1976. 
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common phenomenon of the learning curve, down which unit costs decline over time. 
So new technologies may either not be developed at  all, or if developed may not 
diffuse, simply because they are not able to catch up with the historically developed 
advantages of an embedded technology.  
 
The second issue relates to system effects. Here the issue is has been raised above: a 
technology rarely consists of a single artifact, but more often is composed of many 
elements that make up a complex system. These may consist of technical elements, but 
may also  involve social patterns of use and development.  On the purely technical 
level, most technologies are complex products and processes, consisting of more of 
less detailed systems of interconnecting components, devices, knowledges and skills. 
Technical complexity of this type has grown radically over the past century or so, and 
the number of components in many current products is orders of magnitude greater 
than even twenty years ago. But technologies are also systemically connected with the 
social world: with patterns of education and training, with infrastructures, with forms 
of  production  organization,  with  modes  of  technology  use,  and  with  modes  of 
consumption. These systemic aspects of technology mean that it can be very difficult 
to  change  particular  technologies  (such  as  the  use  of  carbon-based  fuels) 
independently  of  changes  in  the  system  as  a  whole.  But  system  changes  are 
considerably  more  difficult  to  initiate  and  sustain  than  changes  in  individual 
techniques. So an important problem, both for analysis and policy, is to distinguish 
carefully between cases where technological change is relatively unproblematic, and 
cases in which systemic factors generate major obstacles to change. We then need to 
understand in more detail the character of such obstacles, and their implications for 
policy foundations, policy design and implementation measures. 
 
Both the temporal and system dimensions are important in explaining why it is that 
apparently superior technologies diffuse so slowly, and why regime changes take such 
long times. This is of course a common feature of major technological transitions: 
steam  power  has  already  been  mentioned,  but  in  the  electrification  revolution  the 
dynamo  replaced  steam  power  only  very  slowly,  diesel  locomotives  were  slow  to 
replace steam locomotives (and electrification of rail was also slow), petrol aircraft 
engines  were  slow  to  disappear  in  the  face  of  jets,  sail  persisted  in  the  face  of 
steamships, mainframe and supermini computers persisted long after the emergence of   26 
“client/server” architectures, etc.31 This occurs not just because the old technologies 
take time to disappear – rather they continue to be improved and they continue to sell 
long after the new technology has entered the market.32 The remarkable fact is not that 
the new technologies are slow to become dominant: it is that they survive at all. How 
the new survives, and why and how it sometimes takes over, will be discussed below. 
 
3  TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION OPTIONS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
This  section  uses  the  framework  outlined  above  –  of  incremental,  disruptive  and 
radical innovation – to look at the current modes of innovation and policy support 
directed towards climate technologies. Environmental innovation  can be conceived 
very widely, but as noted above, this runs the risk of lumping many different types of 
action together:  
 
A broad definition of environmental innovations would include all measures 
that conserve energy and materials, and minimise the environmental load. In a 
broader view environmental innovation consists of new or modified processes, 
techniques, practices, systems and products to avoid or reduce environmental 
harms.33 
 
Another broad definition is given by Shrivastava (1995, p. 185):  
 
Environmental technologies can be defined as production equipment, methods 
and  procedures,  product  designs,  and  product  delivery  mechanisms  that 
                                                            
31 Paul David has demonstrated the system effects that created lock-in and prevented rapid 
diffusion with respect to several technologies: P. David, „The Dynamo and the Computer: An 
Historical Perspective on the Modern Productivity Paradox‟, American Economic Review, Vol. 
80 Issue 2, 355-361, and “Clio and the economics of QWERTY”, American Economic Review, 
Vol. 75 Issue 2, 332-337. 
 
32 On this point, applied both generally and to computing, see T. Bresnahan and S. 
Greenstein, „The competitive crash in large-scale computing‟ in R. Landau et al (eds) The 
Mosaic of Economic Growth (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 1996, 357-397 
 
33 R. Kemp K. Smith and G. Becher, „How should we study the effects of environmental 
regulation on innovation?‟, in J. Hemmelskamp, K. Rennings and F.Leone (eds) Innovation-
oriented Environmental Regulation. Theoretical approaches and empirical analysis (Physica-
Verlag: Berlin), 2000 p.60.   27 
conserve  energy and natural  resources,  minimise the environmental  load of 
human activities and protect the natural environment. 34 
 
3.1 Forms of environmental innovation  
 
Current measures to reduce greenhouse gas impacts or to reduce environmental stress 
fall  into  three  broad  groups:  measures  to  improve  the  efficiency  of  existing 
technologies,  measures  to  contain  impacts  (such  as  carbon  sequestration  or  direct 
climate  intervention)  and  measures  to  create  and  diffuse  non-hydrocarbon  energy 
technologies  for  energy  production  and  use.  Each  of  these  initiatives  requires 
innovation, but innovation of different types, with quite different degrees of novelty 
and different scales of effort required.  
 
We can classify the potential lines of climate-relevant technology advance along these 
conceptual lines, by distinguishing between three types of innovation and three types 
of  emission  effects.  Table  2  does  this  drawing  on  a  variety  of  sources,  the  most 
important of which is the work of the International Energy Agency. 
 
The first type of environmental innovation includes a wide range of activities and 
technologies, including the following:  
 
  Pollution control technologies that prevent the direct release of environmentally 
hazardous  emissions  into  the  air,  surface  waters  or  soil  (classic  end-of-pipe 
technologies like fluegas-desulphurisation, car exhaust purification and biofilters) 
  Waste management: handling, treatment, and disposal of waste both on-site by the 
producer of waste and off-site by waste management firms. 
  Clean technology: process-integrated changes in production technology that reduce 
the amount of pollutants and waste material that is generated during technology 
production and use. 
  Recycling:  waste  minimisation  through  the  re-use  of  materials  recovered  from 
waste streams.  
                                                            
34  Paul  Shrivastava  (1995),  „Environmental  Technologies  and  Competitive  Advantage‟, 
Strategic Management Journal 16: 183-200.   28 
  Clean  products:  products  that  give  rise  to  low  levels  of  environmental  impact 
through the entire life cycle of design, production, use and disposal. Examples are 
low-solvent paints and bicycles, but this would extend also to car engine efficiency 
increases. 
  Innovations in the packaging and delivery of goods in ways that reduce the overall 
environmental load. Examples are low-weight packaging materials and reusable 
packages 
  Organisational innovations such as the use of environmental management systems. 
 
Table 2: Modes of energy innovation 
  Incremental 
change 













District heating and 
cooling 
Gas baseload power 
Carbon 
sequestration/clean coal 
(including capture and 
geological storage) 





Advanced materials for 
transportation 
































Sources: Various, but see in particular IEA, Energy Technologies at the Cutting Edge (Paris: 
OECD/IEA) 2005; also R. Socolow, “Stabilization Wedges: An Elaboration of the Concept” 
in H.J. Schellnhuber et al. (eds.) Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change (Cambridge: CUP) 
2006. 
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It  is  the  case  with  most  of  these  types  of  measures  that  innovation  is  largely 
incremental in the sense that it involves improvements in technologies that exist or the 
application of forms of knowledge that already exist. There may be problems to do 
with incentives for firms to develop or adopt such innovations, but the technological 
solutions themselves either exist or are readily foreseeable. Moreover innovations in 
these areas can be introduced more or less on a piecemeal basis because they fit into 
existing  patterns  of  production  and  consumption,  and  into  existing  patterns  of 
corporate and consumer behaviour. 
 
The second set of measures, to do with carbon sequestration or climate engineering, is 
more problematic. The sequestration effort applies to a widely applicable clean-up 
technology  that  would  leave  existing  hydrocarbon  generation  technologies  intact. 
There  are  two  main  technological  functions,  namely  carbon  capture  and  carbon 
storage, for each of which there is a range of potential solutions.35 Although there are 
some major sequestration activities underway (the Norwegian oil company, Statoil, is 
currently sequestering approximately one million tonnes per year of recovered CO2 by 
injecting it into a geologic formation under the North Sea associated with the Sleipner 
gas field) this is still a technology at an early phase. At the present time none of the 
major capture technologies is economically feasible, with sequestration from coal and 
oil power plants currently costing between $US100 and $US300 per ton of emissions. 
There is therefore no „dominant‟ or even generally used technology, and the problem 
is to identify which technology or group of technologies might provide sequestration 
solutions.  This  is  typical  of  a  disruptive  innovation.  This  is  a  situation  –  not 
uncommon  in  the  history  of  technology  –  where  a  technical  function  is  readily 
identified,  but  where  no  dominant  technological  solution  exists,  and  where  the 
emergence  of  a  solution  will  probably  involve  some  kind  of  more  or  less 
discontinuous change to existing knowledge and technical practice. In fact, there are a 
number of potential disruptive changes that would leave the existing system more or 
less intact while dramatically changing its functioning and the related environmental 
load.  Apart from sequestration, another array of disruptive changes would encompass 
                                                            
35 For capture, at least five basic technological principles are relevant: absorbtion, adsorbtion, 
distillation, gas separation and mineralisation; beyond these lie the application of new 
materials (including nano materials), and CO2 hydrate formation and separation. Options 
range from clean-up approaches to full-scale change in power technology cycles. There is also 
a range of geologic storage options and related technologies.   30 
various  climate-engineering  solutions:  sun  shields,  sulphate  particle  seeding  in  the 
stratosphere, and new methods of ocean cloud formation.  
 
The third area of technology measures, the domain of potential radical innovation, 
concerns full-scale non-emitting alternatives to the hydrocarbon energy system. These 
are clean products that minimise environmental impacts at all stages of the energy 
cycle, and – at an even more ambitious level – very low or zero emission energy 
production  and  use  technologies.  They  imply  shifts  in  the  underlying  generic 
technologies on which the present industrial economy is based. This is the level at 
which it is currently difficult to envisage change, yet it is the level at which the really 
significant  environmental  technology  challenges  exist.  Here  the  scientific  and 
technological  challenges  cover  the  spectrum  from  power  generation  to  storage, 
distribution  and  use.  The  search  options  include  fusion  technologies  for  power 
generation, non-emitting hydrogen production and the development of a full set of 
hydrogen-based applications, large scale energy storage technologies (important with 
respect  to  the  long  term  viability  of  current  non-emitting  technologies,  such  as 
windmills and solar panels, which suffer from intermittent generation), space-based 
solar power generation and transmission, and major global changes in urban planning, 
design  and  ecologies  (with  concomitant  infrastructure  changes).  Some  of  the 
challenges here begin involve scientific and technological breakthroughs whose form 
cannot  at  present  be  envisioned.  An  important  feature  of  each  of  these  potential 
technologies is that there exist many conceivable forms that technological solutions 
might take: there are no clear routes forward, and so there are multiple search paths 
towards viable solutions. 
 
3.2 Innovation instruments for energy innovation  
 
What are the incentives and impulses to innovation at the three levels outline above – 
incremental,  disruptive  or  radical?  Current  innovation  policy  instruments  and 
approaches to new energy technologies are essentially focused on the incremental and 
disruptive  modes  innovation  described  above.  Instruments  are  essentially  of  three 
kinds. There are price-based incentives deriving from emission caps or taxes. With 
more direct technology policy measures, instruments rest firstly on the idea that R&D 
is  the  central  initiating  aspect  of  innovation,  and  that  the  principal  problem  is  to   31 
commercialise  or  to  spread  awareness  of  it.  More  relevantly,  they  also  contain 
measures that promote the spread of developed but uncommercial technologies (such 
as solar panels) via tax credits, rebates or procurement. 
 
The excellent Pew Report on climate change implications of US technology policies 
offers the following overview of US policy instruments: 
 
Table 3: US Technology Policy Tools 
Direct Government 
Funding of Research and 
Development 
Direct or Indirect Support 
for Commercialization and 
Production: Indirect 
Support for Development 
Support for Learning and 
Diffusion of Knowledge 
and Technology 
R&D contracts with private 
firms (fully-funded or cost-
shared) 
R&D contracts and grants 
with universities 
Intramural R&D conducted 
in government laboratories 
R&D contracts with industry-
led consortia or 
collaborations among two or 
more of the actors above 
Patent protection 
R&D tax credits 
Tax credits or production 
subsidies for firms bringing 
new technologies to market 
Tax credits or rebates for 
purchasers of new technology 
Government procurement 
Demonstration projects 
Education and training 
(technicians, engineers and 
scientists, business decision-
makers, consumers) 
Codification and diffusion of 
technical knowledge 
(screening, interpretation and 
validation of R&D results; 
support for databases) 
Technical standard setting 
Technology and/or industrial 
extension services 
Publicity, persuasion and 
consumer information 
Source: J. Alic, D. Mowery and E. Rubin, U.S Technology and Innovation Policies – Lessons 
for Climate Change, Pew Centre on Global Climate Change, 2003, iii. 
 
This array of instruments involves firstly is an overemphasis on R&D. It was argued 
above that a fundamental problem with the innovation perspective of the Stern Review 
was its reliance on an obsolete concept of innovation processes, and its emphasis on 
R&D and commercialisation programs as policy supports. This means that the effects 
are unlikely to be significant, at least within a reasonable time-period.  
 
More  positively  it  involves  regulatory  incentives,  procurement  instruments  and 
standardisation methods that will affect and modify existing technological practices – 
this  includes  most  pollution  control  technologies,  waste  management  technologies, 
and some process-related clean technologies. Within engine technologies, price shifts 
for  fuel  will  generate  search  for  incremental  fuel  efficiencies;  this  has  been  very 
marked since the 1970s, as a result of OPEC I and II, and subsequent changes in tax   32 
regimes (notably in Europe). We already have abundant evidence that environmental 
innovation at this level occurs frequently, such as changes in construction methods and 
especially insulation as a result of fuel cost changes.  
 
Depending  on  the  specifics  of  policy  design,  emissions  control  policies  based  on 
quantity caps and treading permits, or on emissions taxes, can be expected to provide 
adequate incentives for this type of innovation. They may also have impacts on the 
diffusion of disruptive technologies mentioned above, such as solar panels, geothermal 
energy or wind power.  
 
Further measures are likely to be necessary in the case of disruptive innovations. The 
central problems lie not in creation of functioning technologies but in getting existing 
techniques to an economically competitive point. Solar panels, for example, are now a 
well-known technology developing along a fairly clear trajectory, and there are at least 
twenty fairly large global producers. But they are far from being cost competitive, and 
clearly require many years of development before reducing their costs to levels that 
would enable them to compete with the main elements of the electricity grid. Policy 
support for continuance along these trajectories would (and in fact, do) take the form 
of fiscal incentives to diffusion: subsidies to production, subsidies to adoption, and 
public  procurement.  A  second  array  of  disruptive  measures  would  be  the  carbon 
sequestration  technologies  referred  to  above.  Since  this  relates  to  a  direct  market 
failure  taking  the  form  of  a  detrimental  externality,  and  since  there  are  beneficial 
externalities from adoption, the appropriate policies might be research support and 
regulation to impel adoption.  Although the design and implementation of appropriate 
regulatory  instruments  is  a  demanding  process,  it  is  nonetheless  feasible  and 
productive.  Even  here,  of  course,  system  effects  need  to  be  considered,  since 
incremental change in technological systems may require us to look far beyond the 
point at which we would like to promote change – into supplier industries, or demand 
conditions, for example. 
 
The overall set of incentives and policy support measures are clearly having impacts 
on current innovation trajectories. The best evidence for this is in the patent record. 
Recent  OECD  work  on  patenting  at  the  European  Patent  Office  suggests  three 
conclusions: firstly that renewable energy sources and mitigation of vehicle emissions   33 
are major sources of patenting at the present time. Figure 1 shows that at the present 
time  12%  of  the  stock  of  EPO  patents  relate  to  environmental  issues.  However 
renewable energy and motor vehicle abatement technologies make up much higher 
percentages. So there is strong inventive activity being revealed by the patent stock 
data. 
 









Solid Waste Renewable Energy Motor Vehicle Abatement Total patents
%
 
Source: OECD Patent Database at www.oecd.org/sti/ipr-patents.  
 
The largest category of patents is in renewable energy, and this area has been growing 
rapidly  in  recent  years.  Figure  2  shows  how  this  looks  among  different  types  of 
renewables. 
 
At  the  same  time  there  has  been  sharp  growth  in  integrated  emissions  control 
technologies for vehicles: from just over 400 patent applications in 1995 to nearly 
1100  in  2001.  These  trends  in  patenting  suggest  that  both  existing  incentives  and 
policy  instruments  are  working  to  increase  activity  across  the  whole  range  of 
incremental and disruptive changes. Whether the current effort is big enough, or in the 
right directions, or whether it is getting the right policy signals, is of course still open 
to question. But the incentives and policies are there. The matter of support for more 
radical change remains outside the zone of current policies, however. 
   34 























Source:  N. Johnstone  and  I.  Hascic,  “Eco-innovation, policy and globalisation”,  OECD 
Observer, No 264-265 Jan 2008, pp.15-16. 
 
3.3 The innovation policy challenges of climate change: supporting radical search 
and change 
 
The set of non-emitting technologies in the bottom right-hand panel of Table 2 above 
exhibits all of the characteristics of historical radical innovations: major scientific and 
technological  challenges,  extreme  uncertainty  about  technical  and  economic 
feasibility, a multiplicity of potential technical choices and development paths, major 
investment risks and possibly deficits (due in part to absence of relevant investment 
appraisal  techniques),  lack  of  accompanying  infrastructures,  collective  invention 
characteristics (with a very dispersed R&D and engineering effort globally). Yet it is 
here that we find the ultimate array of options for climate control, and this section 
turns to the issues in developing and sustaining such options. 
 
Shifts in technological regimes have occurred in the recent past, such as computing, 
mobile telephony and satellite communications. What then are the characteristics of 
such change, and what do these characteristics imply for public policies now? Three 
important  characteristics  can  be  suggested.  The  first  is  that  the  core  generic   35 
technologies of the modern world have emerged via goal-directed “mission-oriented” 
programs. They have not evolved piecemeal out of applied engineering efforts based 
on research results, but are the outcomes of purposive efforts aimed at securing pre-
envisioned outcomes.36 These „missions” have historically had a variety of forms and 
coordinators. The second characteristic is that these efforts have usually been aimed 
not at individual technologies, but at the creation of systems of technology and use-
forms: such changes as the transition to electricity were, as Thomas Hughes has put it, 
“systems,  built  by  system  builders”.37  The  third characteristics  is  that  the  modern 
forms of these epochal shift have largely been initiated and sustained by governments 
and government agencies, utilising the innovation systems of which they are a part.  
 
The role of government or public agencies has been pervasive, the main evidence 
being the histories of the technologies in question. Many of the core technologies of 
the modern era appear to have their origins in mission-oriented programs that involve 
firms as participants but not as initiators.38 For example, the histories of computing, 
aerospace technologies, nuclear power, telecommunications (especially satellite-based 
communications and mobile telephony), biotechnology development, high-speed rail 
and the Global Positioning System suggest that many of our core technologies find 
their origins in attempts by public-sector agencies to create technologies or exploit 
scientific  potential  to  fulfill  new  technical  functions. 39  Although  they  involve 
                                                            
36 This does not at all mean that innovators envision all of the outcomes. Society has a 
persistent habit of using new technologies in ways that cause great surprise to innovators. For 
example, the innovators behind mobile telephony envisioned a world of mobile 
communications primarily for business users, and were stunned when predominantly young 
users first began using mobiles, and then sending text messages (which were originally seen as 
a pager substitute for business) in large volumes. This shifting of use is a major source of 
technological risk and uncertainty. See Nathan Rosenberg, “Uncertainty and technological 
change”, in T. Landau, T.Taylor and G. Wright, The Mosaic of Economic Growth (Stanford, 
Ca.: Stanford University Press) 1996, pp.334-353 
 
37 Thomas Hughes, „The evolution of large technological systems‟, in W. Bijker, T. Hughes 
and T. Pinch, The Social Construction of Technological Systems, (Cambridge: MIT), 1989, 
51-82. 
 
38 The concept of “mission-oriented” technology policy is very useful but rather neglected. It 
derives from H. Ergas, “Does Technology Policy Matter?”, Technology and Global Industry, 
(Washington: National Academy of Sciences) 1987, 191-245 
 
39 For an excellent account of one of these processes, studying the role of government in the 
US success in the computer industry, see Computer Science and Telecommunications Board,   36 
research, often on a spectacular scale, they are in fact outcome-driven. They result 
from attempts to solve specific socio-technical problems, some civil but others notably 
military.  In  the  modern  cases  governments  or  public  sector  agencies  have  played 
central  roles  in  actually  initiating  and  managing  the  development  programs  of  the 
technologies referred to above.  So the GPS system was developed (and continues to 
be  run)  by  the  US  Air  Force,  having  evolved  out  of  long-term  efforts  to  provide 
strategic  bomber  navigation  systems;  the  Internet  emerged  out  of  Department  of 
Defense attempts to create survivable computer capacity.40 As a civil example, the 
Nordic  mobile  telephony  systems  emerged  from  the  state -monopoly 
telecommunications services providers of the Nordic area, who through the Nordic 
Telecommunications  Union  envisaged  (beginning  in  1948)  mobile  te lecoms  as  a 
solution to the major communications challenges of the region. In earlier cases, such 
as those involving the diffusion of steam power, the creation of electricity networks or 
the  rise  of  automobile  transport,  governments  provided  enabling  infra structures, 
regulatory  frameworks  that  reduced  uncertainties  and  increased  safety  (and  thus 
promoted adoption), or direct interventions to enable system benefits to be achieved. 
So although in Europe much electricity development was initially private in character, 
governments increasingly intervened (indirectly or via nationalisation) to create the 
network integration through which the economic benefits of the underlying innovation 
were realised.41  
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Funding a Revolution. Government Support for Computing Research (Washington USA: 
National Academy Press), 1999. On mobile telephony, Sven Lindmark, Evolution of techno-
economic systems: an investigation of the history of mobile communications, Chalmers 
University of Technology, 2002, ISBN 91-7291-194-8 and Johan Hauknes and Keith Smith, 
Corporate Governance and Innovation in Mobile Telecommunications: How did the Nordic 
Area Become a World Leader? Report to the European Commission, DG-Research, Corporate 
Governance and Innovation Project; on GPS, S. Pace et al., The Global Positioning System: 
Assessing National Policies, (Rand Corporation, 1995), especially Appendix B, „GPS History, 
Chronology and Budgets‟ 
 
40 The role of military technology creation in the US is well-known, though it is not widely 
appreciated that such ostensibly civilian phenomena as Silicon Valley owe an enormous 
amount to military funding and decision-making. This is true of many other economies, and is 
under-studied; see Thomas Heinrich, “Cold War Armory: Military Contracting in Silicon 
Valley, Enterprise and Society, Vol. 3 No. 2, 247-284; for an account of the military role in 
the UK, see D. Edgerton, Warfare State. Britain 1920-1970 (Cambridge: CUP) 2005. 
 
41 Robert Millward, “Business and Government in Electricity Network Integration in Western 
Europe, c.1900-1950”, Business History, Vol. 48 No, 4, 2006, 479-500.   37 
Is this place of the public sector in major innovations merely contingent, or is there 
something necessary about its role in mission-oriented technology development? This 
is  clearly a  central  question for any attempt to  conceptualise the nature of radical 
innovation.  
 
Radical innovations as defined above involve at least six major problems that are more 
or less unresolvable by profit-seeking potentially innovating firms. These problems are 
not  necessarily  market  failures  as  conventionally  understood.  They  relate  to 
information  failures,  to  institutional  failures,  to  coordination  failures,  and  to  more 
general investment obstacles related to radical innovations. The six broad problems 
are: 
 
Time  horizons  and  financial  commitment.  The  long  time  horizons  and  circuitous 
search paths involved in radical innovations make it virtually impossible for rational 
capital  accounting  and  investment  appraisal  around  these  technologies,  which  also 
require long-term financial commitments that are simply beyond the ability of any 
profit seeking firm (under normal methods of corporate governance) to undertake.  
 
Risk bearing and the management of uncertainty. These technologies tend to involve 
serious technological risks (in the sense that there are serious risks of technological 
failure), and economic risks (in the sense of very high probabilities of capital loss for 
particular projects). They also face uncertainty in the Knightian sense, since the time 
horizons are so long that utterly unexpected solutions may emerge that enhance or 
destroy particular search avenues.42 
 
Indeterminate  outcomes  and  multiple  search  paths.  It  is  usually  necessary  not  to 
undertake a single search path in the case of radical technologies: overlapping and 
multiple paths are a key feature of success in these fields (demonstrated most sharply 
in the US cases of nuclear weapons and computing technologies). 
 
                                                            
42 Historically, this has been a major economic function of government: David A. Moss, 
When all Else Fails. Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press), 2002.   38 
Social adaptation. Society does not simply adapt to new technologies, it also shapes 
them. But there are often social adjustments and adaptation that need to be made for a 
radical  innovation.  These  may  include  regulation,  training,  changes  in  physical 
infrastructures etc.; they are beyond the capabilities of individual investing firms.  
 
Coordination failures. Innovations occur as complex systems, which require system 
coordination. In some cases a dominant large firm can achieve this, but it can also be 
addressed either tacitly or de facto by public agencies. 
 
Overcoming lock-in. Overcoming lock-in to a currently dominant technology typically 
requires the protection of niche markets, public procurement, and patronage that tend 
to be provided only by interested and wealthy elites or by government. 
 
These considerations suggest  a more overt role for the public sector in generating 
radical technologies for low-emissions energy production. Before turning to issues of 
policy design, we need to ask the more fundamental question: Is such a public role 
feasible with current forms of policy organisation? 
 
 
4.  POLICY  RATIONALES  AND  INTERNATIONAL  POLICY 
COLLABORATION  
 
4.1 The rationale for public sector support 
 
The previous section has indicated a range of ways in which governments have been 
involved  in  the  creation  and  diffusion  of  major  technologies.  Of  course  the  mere 
empirical fact of such involvement, even over a long historical period, does not mean 
that governments have any necessary role in supporting innovation, or that they should 
intervene in the creation of technologies. What then is the rationale for public sector 
intervention in support of innovation, and especially of radical innovation of the type 
emphasized in this paper? 
  
The most common rationale for public intervention is that some “market failure” exists 
as a result of which welfare-enhancing action is possible but will not be undertaken by 
private profit-seeking firms or by individuals. However not all of the problems that   39 
involve governments in market economies are best understood as market failures, and 
this  section  discusses  two  of  them,  namely  missing  or  weak  institutions,  and 
coordination problems in complex economies.  
 
The market failure approach rests on the idea that markets can fail to produce optimal 
results, but it often goes on to suggest that such problems can be resolved by the 
creation of markets, or by taxes or subsidies that correct price distortions. In the case 
of public goods, where consumption is both non-excludible and non-rival (such as 
street lamps or defence), governments should directly provide the good. The “market 
creation” approach to policy usually takes two forms, each of which has limitations 
when  applied  to  environmental  technology  issues.  Firstly,  it  suggests  that  market 
failures can be resolved by the creation of property rights – so problems associated 
with  beneficial  and detrimental externalities  can be resolved by the  assignment of 
prices, or combination of price and property rights, which may then be traded. This of 
course  underlies  carbon-pricing  policies  that  lead  to  administratively  established 
markets. Secondly, some market failures can in principle be resolved by the creation of 
contingent markets, which take account of varying states of the world. So appropriate 
futures markets will provide incentives for forward-looking behaviour, and this is also 
provides incentives for innovation in fields where futures prices are rising.  
 
In the field of innovation the most common argument around market failure concerns 
the alleged public good character of R&D: the view is that firms under-perform R&D, 
because with non-excludability and non-rivalry others can use R&D results, and the 
performing firm cannot therefore appropriate the full benefits. This failure is corrected 
through the creation of time-limited property rights via the patent system, or by R&D 
tax credits, or by direct subsidies to R&D. With respect to energy innovation we have 
already seen this approach in the Stern Review, which argues for R&D subsidies in 
transport fields and in energy production. The fundamental problem with this approach 
is not necessarily that it is wrong, but that it is only limitedly relevant. Two core 
results of modern innovation research are firstly, that outside the biomedical field, 
patents – while useful as an indicator – are not an important method of appropriating 
innovation benefits, and secondly, the performance of R&D and hence its financing   40 
issues  are  only  single  components  of  complex  innovation  processes,  and  are  not 
necessarily fundamental to the problems that innovating firms face.43 
 
It is not obvious, however, that we should think purely in terms of markets and market 
failure. It is important to remember that the “market mechanism” can be a somewhat 
misleading term, because markets are not in fact a mechanism: markets do not make 
decisions for the allocation of resources, particularly for the allocation of resources to 
innovation.  In  the  private  sector,  the  managements  of  business  enterprises  make 
decisions, and so what really matters are the contexts in which they make decisions, 
and  how  those  contexts  shape  their  ability  to  commit  resources  to  innovation 
programs. These “contexts” include market signals and conjectures about their future 
shape, but they also include institutional constraints, and coordination obstacles. In 
particular the absence of relevant institutions, or their particular forms of operation, or 
the inadequacy of linkages and hence coordination, can reinforce lock-in and inhibit 
firms  form  making  innovation  investments.  These  institutional  and  coordination 
problems can also be considered “failures”, but they are problems not of markets but 
of the structure and operations of the innovation system; neither can they be resolved 
by the creation of actual or quasi markets.  
 
Institutions are legally or customarily formed “rules of the game”, that shape economic 
behaviour; they are usually associated with organisations that implement, manage or 
enforce institutional rules. Key institutions in market economies affecting innovation 
concern  the  rule-systems  shaping  corporate  governance,  the  production  and 
distribution of knowledge, and the management  of risk and uncertainty. Corporate 
governance is typically seen as being about the principal-agent problems associated 
with  making  managers  responsible  to  owners,  and  about  the  market  for  corporate 
control. But the system can also be seen as a set of rules and practices that govern the 
extent to which corporate managers can invest in the tangible and intangible assets that 
are  needed  to  innovate.  From  this  perspective  the  key  elements  of  the  corporate 
governance system would be the explicit or implicit rules that determine the stock of 
firm-specific  innovation-relevant  assets,  the  time  horizons  over  which  innovation 
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Winter, S., “Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development”, 
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investments  can  be  made  (and  the  expected  rates  of  return  that  are  required  from 
them), and the extent to which innovation projects can take on technical or economic 
risk. The issue of risk and uncertainty goes beyond corporate governance and into the 
related areas of equity markets and corporate finance. Equity markets both reduce risk 
by diversifying it, and monitor and constrain the actions of management with respect 
to investment. These are complex issues, much debated at present. One area of debate 
concerns whether shareholder-value approaches to corporate governance have reduced 
the ability of managers to create firm-specific assets, and whether they have shortened 
investment time horizons. But if we look at them against the background of the broad 
histories of radical innovation, sketched above, it is not difficult to see that profit-
seeking  firms  are  unlikely  either  to  take  on  the  risks  associated  with  radical 
innovation, nor the time-frames over which those risks must be borne. Nor can we 
envisage  methods  of  investment  or  risk  sharing,  with  our  current  governance 
arrangements that will permit investments in radical innovation. So purely on these 
institutional  grounds  there  is  a  case  that,  if  radical  innovations  are  in  some  sense 
necessary, the public sector will have to play a central role in organisation and the 
commitment of resources. The fundamental rationale for this lies in the long time 
horizons and complex risk structures of radical innovation efforts. 
 
There is also a coordination rationale for a public sector role, particularly where the 
problem  is  to  overcome  lock-in.  Both  markets  and  institutions  are  coordination 
mechanisms, of different types, but they can fail to work effectively. Such failures are 
often  recognised  in  economics,  particularly  in  Keynesian  macroeconomic  theory, 
where sub-full employment equilibria rest on the existence of coordination failures. 
These are situations in which workers would like to work and to consume (at existing 
wage  and  price  levels),  and  firms  would  like  to  employ  and  produce,  but  no 
mechanism  exists  to  overcome  the  inability  of  labour  and  product  markets  to 
coordinate  via  price  signals.  At  this  point,  Keynesian  arguments  for  public 
intervention come into play. 
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Innovation analyses, especially those seeing technologies as systems, also focus on 
coordination  issues.44  Both analytical and policy issues turn on the nature of the 
components of the innovation system, and the nature of the links between them. The 
links may be economic,  they may involve the transmission of knowledge, and they 
may involve the joint use of infrastructures, and so on: the precise connections cannot 
be specified in advance, and often need detailed empirical investigation to uncover. 
Lock-in is a form of coordination problem – a situation in which change is blocked 
because of the absence of a coordinating mechanism or agent. In overcoming lock-in, 
components  of  the  new  system  must  be  integrated  in  a  coherent  way  (that  is,  all 
moving in more or less the same direction, with more or less compatible objectives) 
towards  the  development  and  use  of  the  new  technology  that  is  the  object  of  the 
innovation process.  
 
By  definition,  systems  require  coordination,  but  they  do  not  necessarily  require  a 
coordinating agent. Where institutions, infrastructures or inter-firm  connections are 
well established within a particular technological framework, the coordination needed 
for  innovation  is  usually  routine.  But  where  a  new  technology  involves  a  major 
disjunction, coordination becomes highly problematic. When innovations are radical 
with respect to existing procedures, engineering capabilities or technical knowledge 
bases  they  involve  multiple  component  systems  and  great  complexity,  and  here 
coordination  becomes  necessary  to  insure  inter-operability,  common  technical 
standards, and the integration both of technologies and production organisations and 
skills. That is why technological historians such as Thomas Hughes write about such 
innovations as electricity purely in terms of system construction.45 System builders, 
such as Thomas Edison, were essentially fulfilling a coordination function among 
disparate components of the complex new technology. These coordination issues are 
found in all radical technologies, but over the past cen tury have tended to involve 
                                                            
44 E.g., Sven Lindmark, „Coordinating the early commercialization of general purpose 
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Practice, Vol 7 No 1. 
 
45 In his history of the development of electricity, Hughes emphasized the systemic 
elements of innovation in the electrical power system with successful innovators best 
seen  as  system  managers.  T.P.  Hughes,  Networks  of  Power.  Electrification  in 
Western Society 1880-1930 (Baltimore and London 1983).   43 
government because they also involve long-term financial commitment.  This type of 
view  of  change  within  a  systems  context  is  surely  relevant  to  environmental 
technologies at the more radical level. If environmental innovation is seen as a kind of 
end-of-pipe clean-up technology, then existing organization and regulation systems are 
likely to be adequate. But if we see the task of environmental innovation in a more 
radical way, as shifting the fundamental technological systems on which the current 
industrial economy is based, then the coordination problems come to the forefront. A 
systems approach would suggest that the identification of co-ordination failures, the 
design  of  policy  instruments  to  overcome  them,  and  the  development  of  relevant 
actors,  are  likely  to  be  an  important  rationale  for  public  policy  intervention,  and 
important also in deciding its scope and objectives. 
 
4.2 National policies or transnational collaboration? 
 
What  is  the  way  forward  in  developing  an  approach  to  new  radical  climate 
technologies? The discussion above has argued for mission-oriented programs and a 
key role for government. But there are three obvious and cogent objections to the idea 
that government-led mission-oriented innovation programs could conceivably address 
the radical innovation problems related to climate change. This section considers these 
objections, and then offers a solution in the form of a global program, on the scale of 
the IPCC but aimed at engineering and socio-technical solutions, coordinated by an 
international agency. There is one objection I do not consider, namely the ritual notion 
that government “cannot pick winners”. This is not considered here because it is an 
assertion rather than a fact: the historical record – as I have noted above – suggests 
that governments can and do pick winners, the evidence being virtually every major 
technology that we use today.46 
 
The first serious objection to government leadership is that the innovations described 
in the previous section belong to a past in which national governments could structure 
and  deploy  national  innovation  systems  to  seek  particular  radical  innovations  as 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
46 Of course governments have also picked an impressive array of losers. But then so has 
every serious innovating company. The reason for “picking losers” is not that either 
governments or firms are intrinsically bad at technology selection, but rather than real 
innovation involves irreducible risk of technical failure.    44 
solutions to perceived national problems. Ergas pointed out more than twenty years 
ago that the technology policies of the USA, the UK and France (and he might have 
added others) were “intimately linked to objectives of national sovereignty”: 
 
Though relying on market forces, the [capitalist] system has interacted with 
government  ...  [A  primary  way]  relates  to  the  harnessing  of  technological 
power for public purposes. Nation-states have long been major consumers of 
new products, particularly for military uses, and the need to compete against 
other  nation-states  provided  an  early  rationale  for  strengthening  national 
technological capabilities.47 
 
However recent decades have been a period of fundamental transition not only in 
economic policy methods and frameworks but also in basic attributes of the state. 
Liberalisation  and  economic  reform  have  been  widespread  across  the  adv anced 
economies, though taking quite different forms (it is important to bear in mind that the 
Anglo-Saxon liberalisation/reform model is not the only one available, nor the only 
one to have been deployed). But the common themes of privatisation and deregulation 
have  led  to  the  disappearance  of  many  of  the  institutions  and  organisations  that 
supported  the  mission-oriented  efforts  of  the  past.  These  include  state -owned 
enterprises (often monopolies) in utilities and their large research operations (which 
led  the implementation of digitalisation in telecoms, for example). Then there are 
government labs of all types and technology development institutions (so-called PROs 
– Public Research Organisations) that have faced major governance changes that have 
pushed them into more market-oriented project portfolios. Finally, even the military, 
except in the USA, has faced downsizing and governance changes, and privatisation of 
development  capabilities.  So  the  practical  organisational  structure  through  which 
previous generations of radical technology have been developed and/or diffused now 
exists only in heavily modified forms that are arguably very compromised in terms of 
innovation capabilities. Naturally there are variations across countries – France, for 
example, has preserved ownership and governance structures that have enabled it to 
build the TGV high-speed rail system,  arguably a radical  system  innovation (with 
significant climate implications also). This is something that would be impossible in 
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the UK or the Netherlands after deregulation and privatisation of the rail systems: the 
organisational  basis  for  radical  transport  development  is  simply  gone,  and  this 
precludes any sort of action along the lines suggested above. 
 
A second objection is that states have changed fundamentally in what they perceive as 
legitimate domains of  action, and in  terms of their policy  capabilities  for actually 
undertaking  action.  It  is  widely  argued  that  the  nation-state  –  a  form  of  state 
committed to well-defined sovereignty and self-sufficient actions towards welfare and 
military objectives – is in decline or has indeed disappeared.48 Be that as it may, there 
are now clearly recognisable constraints on what governments can or can‟t do, and on 
what  they are indeed willing to  attempt. Even  in  an era of  globalisation they  can 
support national innovation systems via investments in education systems, knowledge 
infrastructures,  financial  mechanisms  and  tax  policies,  and  R&D  and  innovation 
policies. But they cannot undertake the focused government-led initiatives that created 
most of our current generic technologies, because such actions are now neither within 
their capabilities nor their legitimate realms of action. 
 
Finally, even if governments could do such things, why should they? It is very plain 
that climate change is a major global detrimental externality and that any solution to it 
would in effect be a global public good. It is of the essence in public goods theory that 
decentralised solutions are not available, and that public provision is the only efficient 
solution;  the  problems  in  public  good  theory  turn  not  on  the  principle  of  public 
provision but its extent. But where the public good is global in character, then national 
governments  are  in  the  position  that  citizens  would  be  in  a  society  without 
government; adaptive behaviours are possible, but full-scale provision is not. In this 
case, not only do governments lack capabilities towards radical innovation, they also 
lack incentives.  
 
Could the problem of developing new climate-relevant technologies be addressed at a 
world level? The answer suggested here is yes. If world government does not and 
probably cannot exist, this does not mean that collective action towards a global public 
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and the Course of History (Harmondsworth: Penguin), 2003; see also Martin Van Creveld, 
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good is impossible. Indeed one of the clearest trends in current public policy at the 
present  time  is  the  limited  ceding  of  national  sovereignty  towards  transnational 
agencies of collective action and governance. These result ultimately from a primary 
trend  towards  economic  interdependence,  either  via  formal  schemes  of  economic 
integration, or via the de facto links of “globalisation”. The most spectacular example 
of economic integration and institutional creativity is of course the European Union, 
where the creation of a single economic space has involved the accompanying creation 
of legal arrangements taking precedence over those of the Member States, a common 
currency,  EU-level  regulatory  powers,  the  Schengen  agreement  (which  in  effect 
removes  borders),  the  common  R&D  program  FRAMEWORK  (by  far  the  largest 
single  civilian  R&D  program  in  the  world)  and  a  range  of  major  “Technology 
Platform”  projects  that  integrate  business,  universities  and  government  across  the 
Union.  Within  and  around  this  broad  setup  major  transnational  technology 
development programs have been undertaken rather successfully: the European high 
speed  rail  network  known  as  Thalys,  the  EADS  enterprise  (comprising  military 
combat  and  transport  aircraft,  helicopters,  launchers  and  satellites  and  the  Airbus 
business) and the Galileo global positioning system, for example.  
 
The EU is not a special case. Even where countries have retained strongly national 
claims in terms of policymaking and sovereignty they have almost without exception 
(and without much debate) in practice signed up to a myriad of forms of transnational 
governance and regulation. These have been both global and regional. Probably the 
most important has been the WTO, with the key instruments being both the GATT and 
the special treaties surrounding it, notably TRIPS, TRIMS, and GATS.49 These are 
active regulatory forms, with provisions taking the force of law; it is noteworthy that 
without much fanfare they successfully contained and reversed important unilateral 
initiatives by the Bush administration on trade policy. Then there are th e specific 
policy forums, such as the G8, behind which lie major consultative organisations such 
as the OECD and the International Energy Agency (IEA), and the economic agencies 
such as the World Bank, IMF and the banking and financial regulators. Some parts of 
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respectively. The TRIPS agreement dramatically extends intellectual property protection and if 
fully implemented will have strong impacts on global innovation patterns. 
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the UN system are very important, especially the World Health Organisation. This is 
not the place for a full list, let alone a full discussion of these agencies, but it is safe to 
say that they are now a dominant mode of formal and informal governance in the 
world.  Informal,  because  around  these  agencies  exist  networks  of  policymakers, 
regulators and administrators who discuss, consult, generate and use common data 
resources, share information, and coordinate. As Anne-Marie Slaughter has remarked, 
“These  government  networks  are  a  key  feature  of  world  order  in  the  twenty-first 
century, but they are underappreciated, undersupported, and underused to address the 
central problems of global governance”.50 That is not to say that these organisations 
and networks are unproblematic and selfless in their operations and dynamics.51 But 
they do offer a route towards the global coordination that is necessary for radical 
technology development in the face of climate change. 
                                                            
50 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press: Princeton and 
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51 For a pathbreaking study of the developmental dynamics of a number of international 
organisations, see Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World. International 
Organisations in Global Politics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press) 2004.   48 
 
4.2.1 Global technology development for global climate change 
 
In an influential set of works, Wolfgang Reinecke has argued that governments have 
lost  not  only  the  ability  to  enact  policies  on  globally-relevant  issues,  but  also  to 
implement  national  policies  within  borders  that  globalisation  is  rendering  porous. 
They should therefore “delegate tasks to other actors and institutions that are in a 
better position to implement global public policies – like the World Bank and the IMF, 
but also business, labour and nongovernmental organizations”.52 
 
Foremost among such tasks is the search for technological innovations that mitigate 
climate change. The innovation challenge exhibits the potential complexities of most 
radical  innovations:  long  time  horizons,  the  need  for  major  risk-bearing  and 
uncertainty management, the need for prolonged financial commitments, the need for 
multiple and overlapping search paths, complexity and hence coordination challenges 
etc. Taken together these suggest the need for public leadership and management. The 
global public good aspects suggest a need for one or more transnational agencies to 
address the tasks. 
 
The immediate policy tasks might be: 
 
  To finance and support a major program of problem definition, opportunity 
identification,  option  selection  and  program  design  through  an  existing 
international policy agency. This might involve a solution task force on the 
scale of the IPCC, involving scientists and engineers, civil servants and other 
stakeholders. One obvious way would be to extend the remit of the IEA into 
this task. 
  To  map  global  scientific  and  engineering  resources  that  are  actually  or 
potentially  available,  and  to  propose  a  “conceptual  design”  for  appropriate 
coordination and governance mechanisms to integrate them 
  To  negotiate  agreements  on  financing,  risk  sharing  and  arrangements  for 
appropriation of direct benefits from new technologies across partner countries. 
                                                            
52 Wolfgang H. Reinecke, “Global Public Policy”, Foreign Affairs, 76 (1997), 132; see 
Slaughter, op.cit., 262   49 
  To establish a coordinating agency, or to extend the terms of reference of an 
existing agency, and to provide the knowledge resources, capabilities and long-
term  finance  to  support  a  global  coordination  effort,  and  to  design  the 
appropriate program structures 
 
In other words, the problem now is not to rush into a large-scale international program, 
but to explore – as systematically but as rapidly as possible – the modes through which 
this  can  be  developed.  There  are  already  frameworks  through  which  this  can  be 
attempted, such as the remnants of the Kyoto process. The challenge of a large-scale 
global climate technology programme would very likely revitalise this, and take it 
away  from  the  contentious  issues  from  which  it  has  suffered  in  the  past.  A  key 
problem will be how to integrate the social and technological dimensions of change, 
and  how  to  envisage  and  manage  the  transition  processes  that  will  be  necessary. 
Significant work has already been done in this area in the Netherlands, where groups 
of  researchers  in  well-organised  networks  have  been  studying  environmental 
„transition management‟ issues for several years. Although they have not focused on 
the radical change issues advocated here, they have produced major work on the issues 
and methods involved in technological transitions to sustainability.53 
 
4.2.2  National and regional policy agencies in the global context 
 
Since  climate  change  results  from  a  global  externality  it  is  generally  agreed  that 
policies to ameliorate it must be global in character. The analysis of radical innovation 
presented above leads to an argument for new agencies and instruments at a global 
level, to undertake the missions of large-scale innovation that are involved. However 
this does not mean that national or regional jurisdictions do not have central roles to 
play; but it is important to be clear about what actions are appropriate to what levels of 
government. And even where some policy actions are best carried out at national or 
regional levels, there remains a need for global coordination in the content of policy.  
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Some of the more extreme analyses of globalisation argue that national or regional 
policies  are  ineffective  in  the  new  global  context  of  enhanced  foreign  direct 
investment, global capital mobility, significant labour mobility and global norms of 
product quality and standards. This is to neglect the importance of the “innovation 
system” for the innovating firm. It was suggested above that firms do not produce or 
innovate  alone,  but  in  the  context  of  the  economic  institutions  and  knowledge 
organisations of their local societies. Many of the core elements of innovation systems 
are not constrained or even much affected by globalisation. These include education 
systems,  health  and  safety  regulatory  frameworks,  tax  policies,  the  provision  and 
functioning of physical and knowledge infrastructures, risk management institutions, 
and  much  standards  setting  activity.  Certainly  there  are  some  global  constraints 
emerging  from  competition  frameworks,  and  there  are  very  definite  government 
budget constraints. But within those constraints, national and regional governments 
still  have  considerable  freedom  of  maneuver  with  respect  to  the  structuring  and 
functioning  of  the  innovation  system.  These  affect  virtually  all  of  the  policy 
instruments that affect incremental and disruptive modes of innovation; and it is the 
case that these policies often present major challenges of design and implementation 
which are being resolved at national or regional levels. The most important of them are 
the  array  of  carbon  pricing  policies.  But  also  significant  are  regulation  and 
procurement  measures  to  induce  adoption  of  disruptive  technologies  such  as  solar 
panels, wind power or geothermal energy.  
 
The fact that this key policy arena can be national or regional in character does not 
mean they have no international dimension. Simply because any local emission affects 
the global greenhouse gas situation, there needs to be coordination on efforts towards 
the  relevant  innovations.  At  the  moment  there  is  little  in  the  way  of  global 
coordination and there appear to be more or less sharp differences in efforts across 
countries.  One possible indicator of this is the patent record: the EU is specialising far 
more  in  environmental  technologies  than  any  other  major  economy,  as  Figure  3 
suggests.    51 
 
Figure 3: Patent shares: Patent Collaboration Treaty filings on motor vehicle 




Source: OECD:  Patent Compendium 2007, Table 3.7.   
 
 
The data above obviously needs to be normalised by population or GDP, but the EU 
and USA are of comparable size, and so it seems probable that there are some major 
imbalances in current innovative efforts. The general point here is that even where 
there are national and regional policy support functions, especially around incremental 
and  disruptive  innovations,  there  is  a  need  for  international  coordination  and 
agreement.  
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Turning to the more ambitious policies associated with mission-oriented programmes 
for  radical  innovation,  it  is  not  clear  that  only  national  governments  should  be 
involved  in  the  direction,  finance  and  governance  of  such  programmes.  The  main 
reason  for  this  is  that  such  programmes  cannot  consist  merely  of  innovation 
programmes, in the sense of bringing new technologies to the point of technical and 
economic feasibility. They must also involve diffusion and application, and in this 
there will be complex problems of transition management, involving the integration of 
new technologies with social patterns of organisation and technology use.  
 
5  CONCLUSION 
 
The argument of this paper has been that a major element of the innovation challenge 
of  climate  change,  namely  the  need  for  full-scale  alternatives  to  hydrocarbon 
technologies, is being neglected. It is not difficult to see why this should be – the 
problems  involved  in  radical  innovation  in  energy  technologies  are  daunting.  Any 
serious  innovation  programs  will  be  long  term,  expensive,  highly  uncertain  in 
outcome, and must be transnational – indeed global - in character. The process must 
involve search for technologies that are currently either very distant or not even on our 
technological  horizons,  accompanied  by  complex  social  and  political  initiatives  to 
overcome our locked-in dependence on the hydrocarbon regime.   
 
If these challenges are intimidating, it is worth remembering that innovation outcomes 
on a similar scale are not unprecedented. Unforeseen energy carriers have emerged 
before, the most recent spectacular example being nuclear power, which was simply 
unenvisaged considerably less than a century ago. The challenge of landing men on 
the moon involved technologies that did not exist when President Kennedy formulated 
the objective. The technological challenge of storing energy on a large scale appears to 
be intractable, but our society has solved an arguably bigger storage problem, that of 
storing,  rapidly  searching  and  retrieving  vast  volumes  of  information.  The 
technologies  for  doing  this  were  unforeseeable  only  a  short  time  ago,  and  were 
generated by precisely the sorts of programs advocated here. It is worth remembering 
that  highly  intelligent,  well-informed  and  technically  skilled  people  were  deeply 
sceptical about the possibilities for development of this information technology or its 
widespread use, even after it had been shown to be technically feasible. Against the   53 
background  of  the  history  of  technology,  which  is  one  of  often  extraordinary 
innovation and diffusion across a very diverse array of technological regimes, we have 
no reason to be pessimistic about the challenges we face with respect to energy and 
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